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We analyze the microeconomic determinants of cross-border bank acquisitions in 16 
transition economies over the period 1996-2006. By using a latent class discrete choice model 
we explicitly incorporate the macroeconomic and institutional heterogeneity of the transition 
economies into our analysis. We find that foreign banks target relatively large and efficient 
banks when they enter transition economies with weak institutions. This evidence provides 
support for the market power hypothesis. However, when foreign banks enter more developed 
transition economies that have made progress in economic reform, they acquire less efficient 
banks. This result is in line with the efficiency hypothesis. 
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1. Introduction 
During  the  last  decade,  foreign  investors  acquired  many  banks  in  former  socialist 
transition countries. As a consequence, the share of foreign banks in the total assets of 
the banking sector in these countries has increased substantially. In the Central and 
Eastern European countries (CEEC), foreign bank presence has soared from 11% in 
1995 to more than 75% in 2005 (EBRD, 2005). In contrast, cross-border bank mergers 
and acquisitions in advanced economies are rare compared to domestic takeovers (Buch 
and DeLong, 2004).  
What  makes  banks  in  transition  economies  lucrative  targets  for  foreign 
investors? In most of the previous studies, cross-border bank acquisitions have been 
analyzed at the aggregate (macro) level (see De Haan and Naaborg, 2004). Variables 
like geographical distance, language and cultural similarities with the home country, 
and regulatory and supervisory structures are important determinants for the decision of 
foreign  banks  to  enter  a  country  (Berger  et  al.,  2001).  Also  the  level  of  economic 
development  of  the  host  country  seems  to  play  a  role  in  cross-border  takeovers 
(Focarelli and Pozzolo, 2001; Buch and DeLong, 2004). Banks located in countries with 
a stable macroeconomic environment are more likely to be targeted by foreign investors 
than those in countries with an unstable environment. For the transition economies, 
economic reforms are also argued to affect the intensity of foreign bank entry (Lensink 
and De Haan, 2002).  
More  recent  studies  focus  on  the  individual  characteristics  of  target  and 
acquiring  banks  in  transition  economies.  These  micro-level  studies  show  that 
characteristics  of  target  banks,  including  size,  performance,  and  efficiency,  are 
important variables predicting the likelihood of a takeover (Bonin et al., 2005; Lanine 
and Vander Vennet, 2007, Williams and Liao, 2008). Claessens and van Horen (2008) 
report that banks enter those countries where they have an institutional competitive 
advantage over competitor banks. 
Although it is now widely acknowledged that both country-level and bank-level 
variables influence cross-border bank acquisitions, the importance of bank-level factors   3 
conditional  on  country-level  determinants  has  not  been  treated  systematically  in 
previous work.
1 Such an analysis is especially important for the transition countries as 
they not only have diverse economic environments but they are also very different with 
respect  to  institutions  and  culture.  Some  of  the  transition  countries  have  become 
members of the European Union (EU) and have high economic growth rates, while 
others have been less successful in their economic development. This implies that the 
impact of microeconomic characteristics of a domestic bank on the likelihood of being 
taken  over  by  a  foreign  bank  may  be  subject  to  variation  depending  on  the 
characteristics of the host country. 
This paper addresses this issue by using a latent class discrete choice framework. 
Unconditional latent class estimations lend support to the view that the relative strength 
of  microeconomic  factors  determining  cross-border  bank  takeovers  varies  across 
different  groups  of  countries.  Hence,  pooled  estimates  of  the  logistic  model  for  all 
transition countries, as used by, for instance, Lanine and Vander Vennet (2007), might 
provide misleading results. Using macro and institutional characteristics of transition 
countries as latent class covariates, we find that foreign banks are targeting relatively 
large and efficient banks in transition economies with weak institutions, thus providing 
support for the market power hypothesis according to which banks are acquired with the 
objective to increase market power of the acquiring bank. However, when entering more 
developed transition economies that have made progress in economic reform, foreign 
banks  acquire  relatively  less  efficient  banks,  supporting  the  efficiency  hypothesis 
according to which banks are acquired with the objective of upgrading the efficiency of 
the target bank.  
                                                             
1 Lensink et al. (2008) examine the impact of the quality of institutions on the foreign ownership-bank 
efficiency relationship for a broad sample of commercial banks in 105 countries. Another paper that 
comes close to ours is the recent study by Claessens and van Horen (2008), who examine to what extent 
institutional similarities between host and home country affect bank entry.  In contrast to the present 
analysis,  these  papers  do  not  focus  on  transition  countries.  They  also  do  not  examine  whether  the 
influence of bank-level factors is conditional on country-level determinants, which is the focus of our 
analysis.    4 
The  remainder  of  the  paper  is  structured  as  follows.  Section  2  describes  the 
empirical methodology and the data used. Section 3 discusses the estimation results. 
The final section concludes.   
 
 
2. Methodology and data 
 
2.1 Latent class logistic regression model 
We use a latent class logistic regression model (LCL) to examine the impact of bank-
specific  factors  driving  the  cross-border  bank  takeovers  in  transition  economies 
conditional on their macro and institutional characteristics.
2 Similarly to the logistic 
regression model – used for studying cross-border bank acquisitions, among others, by 
Focarelli and Pozzolo (2001, 2008), Focarelli et al. (2002), Lanine and Vander Vennet 
(2007)  -  the  latent  class  modeling  approach  is  based  on  the  principle  of  likelihood 
maximization.  However,  it  is  more  general  as  it  allows  separating  the  sample  into 
unobservable  segments  and  nests  the  simple  logistic  regression  as  a  particular  case 
when the number of classes is equal to 1. In addition, the LCL provides a flexible tool 
for identifying variability of predictors across classes and enables explaining variation 
in  class  probabilities  by  the  means  of  the  covariates.
3  Each  segment  contains  cases 
homogenous on certain characteristics.
4 The cases within classes are assumed to be 
independent, while there is a possibility for dependence of cases across classes.
5  
                                                             
2 A detailed description of the LCL methodology is available in Vermunt and Magidson (2005). An 
alternative to the discrete choice modeling approach is an event-study methodology used by Williams and 
Liao (2008), among others. Haselman (2006) suggests another alternative approach. He estimates a model 
for the lending behavior of banks to examine their strategy and concludes that the decision of foreign 
banks to enter the CEE economies seems to be driven by long-term strategic goals. This conclusion is 
based  on  the  absence  of  a  relationship  between  the  macroeconomic  conditions  in  the  foreign  banks' 
country of origin and their loan supply.  
3 An alternative statistical method for grouping cases based on their characteristics is known as cluster 
analysis. However, nowadays there is a growing consensus that the latent class approach for grouping 
observations is a superior methodology, as it enables to conduct statistical testing and provides more 
flexible tools for analyzing data segmentation (see Lattin et al., 2003). 
4 In our setting, the cases are individual banks. 
5 It is important to notice that due to the longitudinal nature of our data, each case contains repeated 
observations over time.   5 
Our dependent variable (yit) is a dummy that takes a value of one at the time 
when a cross-border bank acquisition was made. The general specification of the LCL 
is: 
,              (1) 
where i and t are indexes corresponding to individual banks and time, respectively, x is 
the unobserved variable varying up to K classes, z
cov is the set of covariate variables 
affecting the probability of being in a particular class, and z
pred is a set of variables 
influencing the dependent variable in each of the unobserved classes.  
In the above specification, f(.) is the likelihood function and P(.) is the function 
determining the probability of belonging to a particular class. The P(.) multinomial 
probability function is specified as: 
  ,                 (2) 
where  is a linear term referred to as baseline-category logistic model. It is important 
to notice that in the case of unconditional logistic regression, the latent class covariates 
z
cov are equal to zero and grouping of cases into classes is not based on class-specific 
characteristics of the data.  
When using one of the classes m=1,2,…M  as a reference category, we get the 
following expression for the linear term ηx|zi: 
,               (3)
   
where  the  coefficients  γ    measure  the  importance  of  particular  covariates  p  in 
determining the probability of belonging to a certain unobserved class. 
In  our  case,  the  dependent  variable  is  discrete,  so  the  function  f(.)  is  also 
expressed in terms of a logistic function:   6 
 .               (4) 
The only difference is that now we use a set of predictor variables to explain the 
class-specific  variability  in  the  binary  dependent  variable  by  the  means  of  a  linear 
function determining the odd’s ratio: 
,             (5)
   
where  the  coefficients  βx  measure  the  importance  of  a  particular  predictor  q  in 
determining the dependent variable for a certain unobserved class x. 
 
2.2 Data 
We  obtain  data  from  different  sources  to  study  cross-country  bank  takeovers  in 
transition  economies.  The  first  is  the  Securities  Data  Company  (SDC)  mergers  and 
acquisitions database produced by Thompson Financial, from which we obtain a list of 
takeovers  during  the  1996-2006  period.  This  dataset  contains  information  on  the 
announcement and effective dates of the acquisition, the names of the bidder and target 
banks, the country of their ultimate parents, and the percentage of shares owned after 
the acquisition. From this dataset, we select completed acquisitions that involve target 
banks in transition economies. In our analysis we only include cross-border acquisitions 
(i.e., parents of bidder and target banks are from different countries), which resulted in 
the control of ownership by the bidder bank exceeding 50% of the equity. 
The second dataset is Bankscope maintained by Bureau van Dijk, from which 
we extract bank level balance sheet and income statement information. We retrieve 
information for all banks located in the 16 transition countries under research, including 
those that were and those that were not engaged in a takeover (target and peer banks, 
respectively).  Our  sample  covers  185  banks  and  contains  1,200  observations.   7 
Altogether,  there  have  been  93  takeover  events  recorded.  Table  1  provides  the 
distribution of these events across countries and over time. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Third,  we  use  different  sources  to  obtain  information  on  institutional  and 
macroeconomic characteristics of the countries in our sample:  
•  To  proxy  the  presence  of  a  market  economy,  we  use  the  overall  score  of  the 
countries according to the economic freedom index of the Heritage Foundation. This 
index is calculated based on a set of policies conductive to economic freedom (trade 
policy,  fiscal  burden  of  government,  government  intervention  in  the  economy, 
monetary policy, capital flows and foreign investment, banking and finance, wages 
and prices, property rights, regulation, and informal market activity);
6  
•  To  proxy  economic  reform  we  use  the  average  of  various  EBRD  indicators  of 
economic  reform  (referring  to  small-  and  large-scale  privatization,  enterprise 
reforms,  price  liberalization,  forex  and  trade  liberalization,  competition  policy, 
banking and non-banking sector reforms, reforms in infrastructure); 
•  To proxy the political regime of a country we use the average of the governance 
indicators of Kaufman et al. (2007) that refer to different dimensions of the political 
system  (voice  and  accountability,  political  stability  and  absence  of  violence, 
government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, control of corruption); 
•  Finally, we obtain information on various macroeconomic indicators and financial 
market conditions using the World Bank’s Word Development Indicators.  
Table 2 contains details of the datasets employed in our analysis.
7  
  
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
                                                             
6  More  information  is  available  at:  http://www.heritage.org/Index/.  De  Haan  et  al.  (2006)  provide  a 
critical survey of the literature using this and other indicators of economic freedom. 
7 All data are available on request.   8 
 
 
3. Empirical results 
 
3.1 The model of Lanine and Vander Vennet (2007) 
The first step in our empirical investigation is to estimate the logistic regression model 
of Lanine and Vander Vennet (2007) using a more general latent class formulation. As 
the  simple  logistic  regression  is  equivalent  to  the  unconditional  latent  class  logistic 
regression with the number of classes restricted to be equal to one, this exercise allows 
us to test whether extending the model by adding for more classes improves the fit of 
the model. The purpose of Lanine and Vander Vennet (2007) is to test two competing 
hypotheses explaining cross-border bank acquisitions, namely the efficiency and the 
market  power  hypothesis.  According  to  the  efficiency  hypothesis,  acquisitions  are 
undertaken with the objective of upgrading the efficiency of the target banks. According 
to the market power hypothesis, acquisitions are used to gain access to a market and 
build  up  market  share  without  improving  the  efficiency  of  the  acquired  banks. 
Following, Lanine and Vander Vennet (2007), we use three indicators of market power 
of a bank (i.e., the logarithm of a bank’s total assets, and its share of loans and deposits 
of all banks), two indicators of efficiency (i.e., the cost-to-income ratio, and the non-
interest expense ratio), and two variables measuring profitability (i.e., return on equity, 
and return on assets).
8 Table 3 provides details of the variables used in our analysis, 
Table  4  displays  descriptive  statistics,  while  Table  5  shows  the  Akaike  information 
criteria (AIC) obtained for up to four latent classes. 
 
[INSERT TABLES 3, 4 and 5 ABOUT HERE] 
 
                                                             
8 The study of Lanine and Vander Vennet (2007) differs in various ways from our study. Whereas we 
focus on a sample of 16 transition countries over the period 1996-2006, Lanine and Vander Vennet’s 
sample consists of CEEC only and covers the period 1995-2002. Furthermore, Lanine and Vander Vennet 
measure cross-border deals using their announcement date, while our measure is based on the date when 
the deal was completed.   9 
It is clear that in most cases, the two-class model has the best fit as indicated by the 
lowest AIC values. The one-class model, corresponding to the simple logistic regression 
as used by Lanine and Vander Vennet (2007), provides the best fit in only one of the 
specifications. We therefore conclude that application of the one-class model can tell us 
little about the exact nature of the relationship between the observed bank acquisitions 
and their bank- and country-level determinants.  
In  what  follows,  we  analyze  the  institutional  and  macroeconomic  country 
characteristics that are likely to be conditioning this relationship. Unlike Lanine and 
Vander Vennet (2007), we use a more direct measure of bank efficiency in our testing 
strategy. For this purpose, we use the stochastic frontier methodology, according to 
which  the  efficiency  of  individual  banks  is  identified  by  benchmarking  their 
performance against a common frontier determined by the best-performing banks in the 
sample. We utilize the time-varying bank-specific efficiency scores (EFF) instead of the 
proxies employed by Lanine and Vander Vennet to test for the efficiency hypothesis 
(see Appendix 1 for further details). Unlike the cost-to-income ratio, the inefficiency 
score  provides  a  direct  measure  of  relative  performance  of  the  particular  bank  in 
comparison to its peers. In particular, it compares the actual level of bank cost to its 
optimal level (cost frontier) given the volume of output produced and input prices. The 
variables describing market power are the same as in Lanine and Vander Vennet, i.e., 
the logarithm of the bank’s total assets (SIZE), and its share of loans (MS_D), and its 
share of deposits (MS_L).  
 
3.2 Testing for differences between latent classes using an unconditional model 
To  identify  different  classes  of  banks,  we  run  unconditional  latent  class  logistic 
regressions using our measure of cost efficiency obtained from the stochastic frontier 
model (EFF) and three measures of market power (SIZE, MS_D, and MS_L). The AIC 
suggests that for all three specifications the best fit is obtained for the model with two 
classes. Table 6 contains the estimation results of the three unconditional latent class 
logit models.   10 
 
[INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
 
In model (1), the distribution of all observations across the classes is 51% and 49%, 
respectively. The efficiency variable EFF is insignificant in both classes, while SIZE 
turns out to be significant and positive for the second class. The impact of EFF is not 
significantly different across classes, while the impact of SIZE is as indicated by the 
Wald test.  
   However, the SIZE variable is not a perfect indicator of target bank’s market 
power since it is an absolute measure and it does not take into account the value of 
assets of peer banks. The other two indicators utilized in models (2) and (3) - the share 
of loans (MS_L) and deposits (MS_D) - are more precise. They are relative measures of 
two main outputs of banks as they take the outputs of peer banks into account.  
The estimation results based on these two measures as shown in models (2) and 
(3) are quite similar. The sample is subdivided into two classes of the size of about 85% 
and  15%  of  the  sample,  respectively.  In  both  models,  the  Wald  test  statistics  are 
significant for all independent variables, implying that their effects differ significantly 
across the two classes.  
To summarize, unconditional latent class estimation results based on a direct 
measure of banking efficiency suggest that there are two distinct classes of banks with 
contrasting  results  in  terms  of  the  cross-border  bank  acquisition  determinants. 
Consequently, an interesting question arises to which extent certain country-specific 
characteristics of banks’ home countries influences the likelihood of a bank being in one 
of the clusters or another. We address this issue in the next section, in which we add 
country-specific macro and institutional covariates to predict class membership.    11 
 
 
3.3  Introducing  country-specific  class  covariates  -  a  conditional  latent  class  logit 
model 
To  identify  country-specific  classes,  we  add  three  institutional  variables  and  three 
macroeconomic variables as covariates into our latent class logistic specification.
9 As 
institutional covariates, we include the average of nine EBRD reform indices (EBRD), 
the average of the six Kaufman et al. (2007) governance indicators (KAUF), and the 
score  of  the  country  in  terms  of  the  economic  freedom  indicator  of  the  Heritage 
foundation (HERIT). All indices have the advantage that they are time varying, which 
implies that they take into account the dynamics of institutional developments observed 
in these countries.  
  The  macroeconomic  variables  utilized  in  our  analysis  include  the  real  GDP 
growth rate (GDP_GR), the logarithm of real per capita GDP expressed in US dollars 
(GDP_PC),  and  the  private  sector  share  in  GDP  (PRIV).  These  variables  indicate 
economic performance of the country (GDP_GR), its living standards (GDP_PC), and 
the role of the private sector in the economy (PRIV). Since these variables are directly 
related  to  the  economic  benefits  foreign  investors  might  expect  after  entering  the 
country, they may affect the decision of foreign banks in terms of the motivation for 
their entry (either efficiency or market power). 
 
[INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Table 7 presents the estimation results for the conditional latent class logistic model. 
Lower  AIC  for  all  three  models  in  comparison  to  the  unconditional  models  lends 
support for the explanatory power added to the model by the inclusion of the latent class 
covariates.  The  distribution  across  the  classes  is  less  equal  in  comparison  to  the 
unconditional  model  (about  90%  and  10%,  respectively).  When  SIZE  is  used  as  a 
                                                             
9 Like in the unconditional logit model, the Akaike information criteria indicate that the optimal number 
of classes is equal to 2, which confirms the presence of two distinct groups of banks with  different 
characteristics in our sample.   12 
measure of market power, the coefficients of the SIZE and EFF variables for the first 
class  are  insignificant.  For  the  second  class,  the  coefficient  of  EFF  remains 
insignificant, but the SIZE coefficient is significant and negative. The significant Wald 
test  statistic  suggests  that  the  impact  of  the  market  power  indicator  is  significantly 
different across classes, which is not the case for the efficiency variable. These results 
suggest that when we measure market power based on the asset value of banks, both the 
market power and the efficiency hypotheses are rejected for banks clustered in the first 
class, and no evidence supporting the market power hypothesis is found for the second 
class. Further, our analysis shows that banks clustered in the first class are located in 
countries with lower economic freedom (negative and significant coefficient of HERIT) 
and weaker governance indicators (significant and negative coefficient of KAUF). Both 
class covariates are significantly different across classes at the 10% confidence level, as 
indicated by the Wald test statistic. The index of economic reforms (EBRD) does not 
have  a  significant  impact.  Also  the  macroeconomic  variables  do  not  significantly 
influence the distribution of the data across countries. These results are confirmed by 
the insignificant Wald test statistic.  
  The distribution across classes becomes stronger and qualitatively similar when 
the other two indicators of bank market power (MS_D and MS_L) are used in the 
estimations. In both models, the first class can be labeled as the “market power” class, 
since both the efficiency and market power variables are significant and positive. The 
picture is completely opposite for the second class (both variables are significant and 
negative), which can be termed the “efficiency” class. Similarly, the only significant 
country-specific  characteristics  conditioning  the  first  class  are  the  two  institutional 
characteristics (economic freedom and governance), while the macroeconomic variables 
remain insignificant. These results suggest that for the majority of the sample (more 
than three quarters) foreign banks were targeting banks in transition economies with a 
high level of efficiency and a large share in the loan and deposit markets, which is in 
line  to  the  results  of  Lanine  and  Vennet  (2007).  The  former  finding  can  also  be 
explained  in  the  vein  of  the  “cream-skimming”  effect  discussed  in  Poghosyan  and   13 
Borovicka  (2007),  according  to  which  foreign  banks  when  entering  the  transition 
markets are targeting the best-performing banks.  
However, for a smaller group of countries foreign investors followed a different 
entry  strategy.  For  countries  with  a  better  institutional  environment  and  significant 
progress in economic reforms, the primary motivation for the entry was to upgrade the 
efficiency of the acquired bank. Ignoring the existence of hidden classes and testing the 
competing hypotheses on a total sample might lead to a biased inference with respect to 
the motivation for foreign entry when one of the classes dominates another in size.  
 
4. Conclusions 
We analyze the microeconomic determinants of cross-border bank acquisitions in 16 
transition economies over the period 1996-2006. By using a latent class discrete choice 
model we explicitly incorporate the macroeconomic and institutional heterogeneity of 
the transition economies into our analysis. Using macro and institutional characteristics 
of transition countries as latent class covariates, we find that foreign banks are targeting 
relatively large and efficient banks in transition economies with weak institutions, thus 
providing  support  for  the  market  power  hypothesis  according  to  which  banks  are 
acquired with the objective to increase market power of the acquiring bank. However, 
when  entering  transition  economies  that  have  made  progress  in  economic  and 
institutional reform, foreign banks acquire relatively less efficient banks, supporting the 
efficiency  hypothesis  according  to  which  banks  are  acquired  with  the  objective  of 
upgrading the efficiency of the target bank.  
Our findings suggest that the concerns of Lanine and Vander Vennet (2007) 
regarding the limitations with respect to the commonly accepted view that foreign entry 
will contribute to the competitiveness and efficiency of banking systems in transition 
are  only  partially  justified.  We  show  that  these  concerns  are  not  valid  for  a  small 
subsample of target banks located in transition economies that have made significant 
progress in terms of institutional development and the restructuring of their economies. 
Foreign investors enter these countries with the aim of upgrading the efficiency of the   14 
acquired bank and utilizing the unexploited profit opportunities. In contrast, foreign 
investors seem to be hesitant in entering transition countries lagging behind in terms of 
economic reforms. For this type of countries, foreigners pursue “cream-skimming” type 
of policies, aiming at acquiring better performing institutions with a high share in the 
domestic  market.  This  strategy  is  less  likely  to  contribute  to  further  efficiency 
improvements in the domestic banking sector.      15 
Appendix 1 
Obtaining  individual  bank  cost  efficiency  scores  using  the  stochastic  efficiency 
frontier model 
Following a recent stream of the literature (e.g., Bonin et al., 2005; Fries and Taci, 
2005; Poghosyan and Borovicka, 2007), we apply frontier analysis for modeling cost 
efficiency of banks in transition economies. For the stochastic cost frontier, we follow 
the modified production approach (see Berger and Humphrey, 1991) and use two types 
of  bank  outputs:  total  loans  (y1,it)  and  total  deposits  (y2,it).  The  banks  provide  their 
services using two inputs, i.e., physical capital and labor. Accordingly, the price of 
physical capital is measured as a ratio of non-interest expenses to total assets (w1,it), 
while the price of labor is proxied by the ratio of total personnel expenses to total assets 
(w2,it).  The  production  technology  might  also  be  influenced  by  the  technological 
progress, for which we control by using a time trend (t). The dependent variable in the 
frontier  is  the  total  cost  of  a  bank  (cit),  which  includes  both  interest  and  operating 
expenses. To account for the country-specific environmental characteristics that might 
have an impact on the bank’s technology, we augment the frontier by introducing real 
GDP growth (GDP_GR), real GDP per capita in US dollars (GDP_PC), and the share of 
domestic credit in GDP (CRED) variables. The final translog specification for the cost 
function takes the following form: 
 
,  (6) 
 
where  i  and  t  are  bank  and  time  indices,  respectively.  The  linear  homogeneity 
restrictions are satisfied by expressing all variables in terms of a ratio with respect to   16 
one of the input prices, and inefficiency is modeled as a function of time using Battese 
and Coelli (1992) specification: 
 
,                    (7) 
 
where ui is the bank-specific inefficiency term that is assumed to have a non-negative 
truncated normal distribution with zero mean and variance σ
2
u, and T is the last period 
in the sample. The overall inefficiency of each individual bank, uit, is varying over time 
at the exponential rate η to be estimated. The intuition behind this parameterization is 
that  the  inefficiency  term  is  assumed  to  be  monotonically  increasing  (positive  and 
significantη),  monotonically  decreasing  (negative  and  significantη)  or  neutral 
(insignificantη) over time. To estimate the model using a maximum likelihood method 
we additionally assume that the random error term, vit, follows a normal distribution 
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Table 1. Cross-border bank acquisitions in transition countries, 1996-2006 
   1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  Total 
AL  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  1  0  0  2 
BA  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  2  0  2 
BG  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  3  1  4 
CZ  1  0  1  1  1  0  1  0  0  0  1  6 
EE  0  1  0  1  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  3 
HR  0  0  0  1  0  1  1  0  0  1  2  6 
HU  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  2 
LT  0  0  0  0  2  0  0  0  1  0  0  3 
LV  1  0  0  1  1  0  1  0  1  1  1  7 
ME  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  0  1 
MK  0  0  0  0  2  1  0  1  0  0  0  4 
PL  4  4  2  5  5  2  1  0  3  1  0  27 
RO  0  0  0  0  1  0  1  1  1  0  3  7 
RS  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  4  4  9 
SI  0  0  0  2  0  1  1  1  0  0  0  5 
SK  0  0  0  0  1  2  1  0  1  0  0  5 
Total  6  5  3  12  14  7  7  5  9  13  12  93 
Note: AL=Albania, BA=Bosnia and Herzegovina, BG=Bulgaria, CZ=The Czech Republic, EE=Estonia, HR=Croatia, 








Table 2. Data sources 
Variable  Definition  Source 
Cross-border bank 
acquisition 
A dummy variable changing its value 
from 0 to 1 at the time when the 
acquisition took place 
Thompson Financial 
Bank financial indicators  Balance sheet items and income 
statements 
Bankscope of Bureau van 
Dijk 
Reforms  Indices ranging from 1 (worst) to 4 
(best) and indicating the progress of 
reforms in the following nine areas:  
small- and large-scale privatization, 
enterprise reforms, price liberalization, 
forex and trade liberalization, 
competition policy, banking and non-
banking sector reforms, reforms in 
infrastructure. 
EBRD Transition Reports 
Governance  Indices ranging from -2.5 (worst) to 2.5 
(best) and indicating the progress of 
governance in following six areas:  
voice and accountability, political 
stability and absence of violence, 
government effectiveness, regulatory 
quality, rule of law, control of 
corruption. 
Kaufman et al. (2007) 
Economic freedom  The score of the country based on its 
progress in terms of economic freedom 
in the following nine areas: business, 
trade, fiscal, government size, monetary, 
investment, financial, property rights 
and corruption. 
Heritage Foundation 
Macro data  Real GDP growth, GDP per capita (real, 
USD) and share of private sector in 
GDP. 








Table 3. Data used in the model of Lanine and Vander Vennet 
Variable  Description  Formula 
Profitability       
ROA  Return on assets (before taxes)  (Pre-tax profit)/(Total assets) 
ROE  Return on equity (before taxes)  (Pre-tax profit)/(Total equity) 
NIM  Net interest margin  (Net interest income)/(Earning 
assets) 
Cost efficiency     
NIEXP  Non-interest expenses  (Non-interest expenses)/(Total 
assets) 
CI  Cost-to-income ratio  (Total expenses)/(Total income) 
Capital adequacy     
CAP  Capital adequacy ratio  (Total equity)/(Total assets) 
Lending activity     
LTA  Net-loans-to-assets  (Net loans)/(Total assets) 
Funding structure     
DEP  Deposit funding  (Total deposits)/(Total assets) 
Size and market share     
SIZE  Size  Log(Total assets) 
MS_L  Market share of net loans  Individual bank loans share in the 
total system loans 
MS_D  Market share of total deposits  Individual bank deposits share in the 
total system deposits 




Table 4. Descriptive statistics 
   Mean  Median  St. Dev.  Min  Max  Skewness  Kurtosis 
EFF  0.67  0.67  0.16  0.20  0.94  -0.36  2.50 
SIZE 
       
960,000  
       
400,000  
   
1,500,000  
            
8,207  
   
13,000,000  
              
3.22  
            
15.59  
MS_D  6.59  2.76  11.14  0.00  100.00  3.65  19.75 
MS_L  3.87  1.46  7.08  0.00  74.73  4.66  34.19 
CI  72.66  67.52  36.81  11.73  528.43  5.09  45.44 
NIEXP  5.72  4.57  4.85  0.28  92.40  6.79  97.02 
ROE  8.10  9.67  29.86  -316.78  564.13  2.43  123.79 
ROA  0.97  1.05  2.57  -31.95  15.92  -3.52  37.47 
HERIT  0.76  0.75  0.35  0.08  1.43  0.03  1.88 
EBRD  3.38  3.43  0.30  2.38  3.96  -0.64  3.10 
KAUF  0.41  0.56  0.41  -0.67  1.05  -0.76  2.69 
GDP_GR  0.04  0.04  0.03  -0.06  0.11  -0.59  4.72 
GDP_PC  8.25  8.41  0.47  7.20  9.23  -0.50  3.18 
PRIV  0.69  0.70  0.08  0.50  0.80  -0.13  1.90 
EFF=cost efficiency of the bank, SIZE=total assets (in thousands of EUR), MS_D = share of bank deposits in total banking system 
deposits, MS_L = share of bank loans in total banking system loans, CI = cost to income ratio, NIEXP = non-interest expenses, ROE = 
return on equity, ROA = return on assets, HERIT = economic freedom index, EBRD = index of banking sector reforms, KAUF = 










Table 5. Testing for the presence of latent classes using Akaike information criteria 
   Models 
Classes  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
1  535.5  535.9  537.2  523.6  528.2  529.5  543.9  543.6  544.6  526.7  526.6  527.9 
2  532.7  522.6  519.9  523.0  534.4  528.7  522.4  518.1  519.6  519.1  517.3  523.0 
3  529.2  524.7  524.7  522.0  533.2  538.7  523.2  518.9  522.1  524.7  521.8  527.5 
4  536.2  531.7  531.6  521.1  539.2  534.5  531.5  526.4  525.3  537.6  529.6  535.2 
Note: numbers in bold indicate minimum values of Akaike information criteria for models up to for classes. Dependent variable is the 
bank acquisition dummy (aff). Models range from 1 to 12 depending on the explanatory variables as follows: 
(1) aff = f(SIZE, CI) 
(2) aff = f(MS_D, CI) 
(3) aff = f(MS_L, CI) 
(4) aff = f(SIZE, NIEXP) 
(5) aff = f(MS_D, NIEXP) 
(6) aff = f(MS_L, NIEXP) 
(7) aff = f(SIZE, ROE) 
(8) aff = f(MS_D, ROE) 
(9) aff = f(MS_L, ROE) 
(10) aff = f(SIZE, ROA) 
(11) aff = f(MS_D, ROA) 








Table 6. Unconditional latent class models 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
  Class-1  Class-2  Test of 
equality 
(p-value) 
Class-1  Class-2  Test of 
equality 
(p-value) 
Class-1  Class-2  Test of 
equality 
(p-value) 
Constant  -1.8  23.7  0.0180  0.8  33.1  0.0004  0.9  14.9  0.1200 
EFF  -4.0  5.3  0.3451  -3.9  39.0  0.0000  -3.9  17.2  0.0000 
SIZE  -0.2  1.3  0.0230  --  --  --  --  --  -- 
MS_D  --  --  --  -0.1  0.9  0.0002  --  --  -- 
MS_L  --  --  --  --  --  --  -0.1  0.6  0.0037 
                   
Statistics                   
Class 
size 
0.51  0.49    0.85  0.15    0.84  0.16   
AIC  651.1    --  639.3    --  645.2    -- 
R2  0.04  0.09  --  0.03  0.89  --  0.03  0.67  -- 
Note: numbers in bold indicate significance at 10% confidence level. Test of equality is a Wald test on the null hypothesis that 













Table 7. Conditional latent class models 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
   Class-1  Class-2  Test of 
equality 
(p-value) 
Class-1  Class-2  Test of 
equality 
(p-value) 
Class-1  Class-2  Test of 
equality 
(p-value) 
Constant  4.9  -13.2  0.0190  3.7  -8.6  0.0000  3.8  -9.1  0.0000 
EFF  0.5  -16.7  0.2200  1.6  -27.2  0.0130  1.9  -27.9  0.0004 
SIZE  0.1  -0.7  0.0260  --  --  --  --  --  -- 
MS_D  --  --  --  0.0  -0.4  0.0001  --  --  -- 
MS_L  --  --  --  --  --  --  0.0  -0.6  0.0003 
                   
Covariates                   
Constant  -38.6  --  0.3407  -30.1  --  0.2700  -27.8  --  0.3300 
HERIT  -37.7  --  0.0350  -4.3  --  0.0270  -4.1  --  0.0300 
EBRD  10.0  --  0.2310  4.2  --  0.2900  3.7  --  0.3600 
KAUF  -16.4  --  0.0001  -11.1  --  0.0003  -10.9  --  0.0008 
GDP_GR  11.6  --  0.9500  9.2  --  0.5600  9.5  --  0.5500 
GDP_PC  10.1  --  0.1665  2.3  --  0.2200  2.1  --  0.2600 
PRIV  17.0  --  0.1201  11.4  --  0.2900  12.1  --  0.2500 
                   
Statistics                   
Class size  0.94  0.06  --  0.91  0.09  --  0.92  0.08  -- 
AIC  520.6    --  521.9    --  521.9    -- 
R2  0.0029  0.4040  --  0.0057  0.7223  --  0.0050  0.7335  -- 
Note: numbers in bold indicate significance at 10% confidence level. Test of equality is a Wald test on the null hypothesis that 
coefficients in different classes are equal. CESifo Working Paper Series 
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